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Reflections on a Civil Right to Counsel and
Drawing Lines: When Does Access to Justice Mean
Full Representation by Counsel, and
When Might Less Assistance Suffice?
Russell Engler1
INTRODUCTION
The past decade has seen an increased focus on issues facing
unrepresented litigants in civil cases in the courts. With growing recognition
that unrepresented litigants frequently forfeit important rights—not due to
the governing law and facts of their cases, but rather due to the absence of
counsel—courts, bar associations, and legal service providers have
struggled to respond. The role of an expanded civil right to counsel as a
component of an overarching access to justice strategy has gained increased
importance.
As advocates push for an expanded civil right to counsel, often called a
“Civil Gideon,” painful theoretical and practical choices challenge efforts to
establish such a right. While the right is typically framed in sweeping terms,
the call falls short of seeking publicly funded counsel for all litigants in all
civil proceedings. Instead, the specter of line drawing looms large.
Assuming there is an expanded right, who benefits? Which cases, or which
clients, will be covered by such a right, and under what circumstances? As
this article discusses, the challenges are nothing new, dating from the early
writings regarding a civil right to counsel. Line drawing is evident in the
evolution of the right to counsel on the criminal side as well.
This article discusses line drawing in the proposals for a civil right to
counsel and lines that might be drawn in the short term to lay the
groundwork for progress in the fight to expand access to counsel. Part I
provides the backdrop to the conversation, which includes the revitalized
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civil right to counsel movement, the challenges presented by unmet legal
needs, the flood of unrepresented litigants in courts, and the increased focus
on access to justice. Part II discusses articles and initiatives in the efforts to
establish a civil right to counsel. While line drawing is inherent to these
efforts, and the particular lines drawn differ in some respects, the common
theme is that these efforts look to a final landscape as to what the right
should entail, often including or excluding entire categories of cases. Part
III urges a focus on line drawing as strategy, not necessarily with an eye
toward the final landscape, but toward starting points on which to build a
movement.

I. THE CONTEXT: UNMET CIVIL LEGAL NEEDS, ACCESS TO JUSTICE,
AND THE RIGHT TO COUNSEL MOVEMENT
This part positions the revitalized civil right to counsel movement against
the backdrop of unmet legal needs, unrepresented litigants, and access to
justice, summarizing each trend in turn. The final two subsections discuss
more recent events in the civil right to counsel movement: first, the national
response to the 2006 American Bar Association (ABA) resolution discussed
below, and second, the scenario in Washington State, the site of the
conference for which this article was written.
A. The Revitalized Civil Right to Counsel Movement
The fortieth anniversary of Gideon v. Wainwright2 was celebrated in
2003, and in the years that followed, there was a sharp increase in activity
supporting a civil right to counsel. Articles3 and conferences4 addressed the
issue, while membership surged in the newly formed National Coalition for
a Civil Right to Counsel.5 Some advocates have attempted to establish the
right to counsel by court decision by pursuing test case strategies,6 while
others have pursued a legislative strategy.7 In 2006, the ABA unanimously
adopted Resolution 112A, urging the provision of legal counsel as a matter
of right at public expense to low-income persons in those categories of
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adversarial proceedings where basic human needs are at stake—such as
those involving shelter, sustenance, safety, health, or child custody—as
determined by each jurisdiction.8
B. Unmet Needs and Unrepresented Litigants
The focus on an expanded civil right to counsel occurred against the
backdrop of unmet legal needs and unrepresented litigants flooding the
courts. Legal needs studies consistently show that 70–90 percent of the
legal needs of the poor go unaddressed.9 Many unmet legal needs involve
housing, family, and consumer issues.10 Legal services offices represent
only a fraction of eligible clients seeking assistance.11
In the “poor people’s courts,” one or both parties appear without counsel
in most cases. Most family law cases involve at least one party without
counsel, if not two.12 Most tenants, many landlords, and most debtors
appear in court without counsel.13 Unrepresented litigants are
disproportionately minorities and are typically poor.14 They often identify
an inability to pay for a lawyer as the primary reason for appearing without
counsel.15 Unrepresented litigants often fare poorly in the courts, which can
have devastating consequences.16
As reality set in that unrepresented litigants—also referred to as selfrepresented or pro se litigants—were here to stay, the phenomenon gained
attention across the country.17 Conferences, publications, and websites
began focusing on problems involving cases with unrepresented litigants.18
One area of focus is on the changing roles for judges, mediators, and clerks
in courts with a high volume of unrepresented litigants.19 Innovative
assistance programs, such as hotlines, technological assistance, clinics, pro
se clerks offices, Lawyer-of-the-Day programs, and self-help centers are
another focus. These programs were developed to provide assistance to
litigants who otherwise would receive no help at all.20
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C. Access to Justice
Concern about the fate awaiting unrepresented litigants in the courts gave
rise to a renewed commitment for access to justice. Conferences of judges
and state court administrators adopted resolutions calling for the courts to
provide meaningful access to justice.21 Spurred by these conferences, access
to justice initiatives intensified across the country.22 The number of state
access to justice commissions increased rapidly; sixteen states created
commissions between 2003 and 2008.23 The commissions are comprised of
members from an array of stakeholders in the legal system.24 The
commissions also have a broad charge to engage in an ongoing assessment
of the civil legal needs of the poor and to develop initiatives to respond to
those needs.25 The work of expanding a civil right to counsel is often
coordinated with, and bolstered by, the work of state access to justice
commissions.
D. Activity in Response to the ABA Resolution
The adoption of ABA Resolution 112A in 2006 spurred a flurry of
nationwide activity. In Massachusetts, the Boston Bar Association (BBA)
created its Task Force on Expanding the Civil Right to Counsel—which
was expanded to include members from key statewide stakeholders. In an
effort to explore starting points for expanding the right to counsel, the Task
Force identified nine pilot projects in four substantive areas.26 In California,
advocates drafted two model statutes providing for an expanded civil right
to counsel.27 In the fall of 2009, California Congressman Mike Feuer
championed a bill to provide funding for the launching of pilot projects.28
Advocates in Maryland held a conference dedicated to the topic in 2007.29
An April 2009 resolution from the Philadelphia Bar Association calling for
an expanded right to counsel has continued to develop.30 And, in New York,
advocates convened in March 2008 for a day-long symposium designed to
create a blueprint for a civil right to counsel in their state.31 Continuing to
build momentum for change in New York, Chief Judge Lippman called for
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implementation of a civil right to counsel and appointed the Task Force to
Expand Access to Legal Services.32
Efforts to raise awareness and increase support for the expanded Civil
Gideon include a steady stream of articles, speeches, and conferences.33 At
the same time, concerns regarding the initiatives emerged: some skeptics
dismissed the idea as idealistic and unachievable,34 some rejected efforts to
draw lines or envision the use of lesser forms of assistance,35 and some
expressed concerns regarding the impact that implementation of such a right
would have on existing civil legal services and criminal defense programs.36
As the pace of activity has increased, the worst recession since the Great
Depression has dramatically increased the number of Americans whose
basic human needs are at issue in legal proceedings and who need counsel.37
Yet, the same funding crisis that increases the numbers of those needing
help has decimated the ability of legal services offices to provide
assistance.38 Offices relying on money from Interest on Lawyers Trust
Accounts (IOLTA) have faced devastating cutbacks with plummeting
interest rates and the collapse of the real estate market.39 Offices dependent
on aid from state and local governments have faced cutbacks due to the
fiscal crises facing the government.40
E. Washington State’s Access to Justice and Civil Right to Counsel
While trends in Washington State are consistent with those nationwide,
Washington often plays a leadership role in right to counsel initiatives. The
Washington State Supreme Court established the Access to Justice Board in
1994,41 which is a forerunner of the commissions that have proliferated
around the country. The ensuing annual access to justice conferences laid
the groundwork for the subsequent calls for recognition of a civil right to
counsel,42 with portions of the 2002 Access to Justice Conference dedicated
to the topic.43 The Northwest Justice Project was a founding member of the
National Coalition for a Civil Right to Counsel and, soon thereafter, created
a full-time staff position dedicated to the topic.44 Washington State
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advocates published articles dedicated to access to justice and the right to
counsel45 and filed litigation seeking to expand the right to counsel in a
number of areas.46 In 2007, the state supreme court promulgated Rule 33,
which provides for requests for accommodation by persons with disabilities;
among its authorized accommodations are “to otherwise unrepresented
parties to the proceedings, representation by counsel.”47
Despite the path-breaking efforts of many in Washington State, its
indigent residents face many of the same problems as those around the
country. The state’s 2003 Civil Legal Needs Study “found that
approximately 87 percent of low-income households in Washington
experience a civil legal problem, and of that group, 88 percent were forced
to navigate their way through the judicial system without the benefit of a
lawyer.”48 As Dean Kellye Testy of the University of Washington School of
Law noted, the current “numbers are even starker when we consider the
subsequent deterioration of our state’s economic health, the historic rise in
unemployment, and the significant increases in the poverty rate.”49
Continuing to tackle the intractable problems of access to justice and right
to counsel, the state’s three law schools collaborated to host the February
2010 symposium entitled, “Civil Legal Representation and Access to
Justice in Washington: An Invitation to an Important Conversation,” the
symposium for which this article was written.50

II. LINE DRAWING IS INHERENT TO THE CONCEPT OF A RIGHT TO
COUNSEL
A. Early Efforts to Establish the Right
The ink was barely dry in the U.S. Supreme Court’s landmark decision in
Gideon v. Wainwright51 before advocates sought to expand the right to
counsel to the civil context. The litigation strategy of expanding the right as
a matter of federal constitutional law achieved noteworthy success in In re
Gault, expanding the right to counsel to juvenile cases, before crashing

CIVIL LEGAL REPRESENTATION

Reflections on a Civil Right to Counsel and Drawing Lines 103

famously in Lassiter v. Department of Social Services, a case involving
termination of parental rights.52
The efforts to expand the right from felony cases in Gideon to juvenile
cases in Gault and termination of parental rights cases in Lassiter reflect
only one form of line drawing and expansion—by category of cases. In his
now-classic law review note appearing in the Yale Law Journal in 1967,
Stanford Professor Thomas Grey articulates other bases for drawing lines.53
Noting that the U.S. Supreme “Court’s own decisions on the right of
representation foreclose any claim that counsel is inessential in civil
trials,”54 Professor Grey asserts that the doctrinal justification for such a
right was easy to make under due process and equal protection grounds;55
he then turns to line drawing. While pausing briefly to consider the merits
of a case-by-case approach similar to that endorsed by Gideon’s predecessor
Betts v. Brady,56 Professor Grey relies on the Supreme Court’s own
assessment of Betts in Gideon, and warns that “the ‘troubled journey’ of the
special circumstances standard should discourage the Supreme Court from
starting a second trip.”57 A very different Supreme Court operating in very
different political times would choose to start exactly that trip with Lassiter.
Professor Grey takes the need for line drawing as a given. He charts a
likely path to expansion as involving the articulation of a new right in broad
terms, though actually applying it, at first, to a small number of cases. His
note identifies bases for line drawing that seem familiar to those involved in
the right to counsel movement. These include distinctions based on the type
of case and, therefore, the interest at stake;58 the plaintiff-defendant
distinction, a theory justified by the voluntariness of the plaintiff’s decision
to head to court;59 the public plaintiff distinction, which is based on the role
of the state in the case;60 and what he calls “statutory manipulation,”
distinctions between state and federal court.61 At every turn, Professor Grey
discusses the shortcomings of the lines being drawn, noting that “not all of
these possibilities are equally serviceable.”62 The scope of the right is
gradually broadened, a technique that “requires resting points, at which the
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Court can halt expansion of the new right while its implications are digested
and institutions are developed to carry it into effect.”63 Professor Grey
labels this process “The Path to an Unqualified Right to Appointed Civil
Counsel.”64
The path to an unqualified right to appointed counsel—and the need for
line drawing—was hardly unique to the civil side. Professor Grey recounted
the history and charted the expansion on the criminal side: first, the
establishment of the right in federal capital cases in Powell v. Alabama;65
second, the expansion through Betts v. Brady66 up through Gideon where
state felonies are involved; and finally, the expansion into the appellate
process in Douglas v. California.67 Benjamin Barton recently traced this
history in far more depth—not to chart the course for expansion of a right to
counsel on the civil side, but as a cautionary tale of the pitfalls of such a
process; his concerns increase with each expansion beyond the original
context of serious felonies.68
Even with the right to counsel firmly established on the criminal side,
line drawing persists. The criminal line-drawing doctrine limits the right to
scenarios involving incarceration.69 In its application, judges, fearful of
depleting the local budgets that finance the provision of counsel for indigent
defendants, avoid the appointment by assessing the likelihood that a lengthy
incarceration will, in fact, be the outcome. Even where the right attaches,
the quality of counsel, including the painfully low threshold that must be
achieved to pass muster under the standard of effective assistance of
counsel, remains a hotly contested issue for analysis and critique.70
B. States’ Expansion of the Right to Counsel
While Lassiter thwarted efforts to establish a broad-based civil right to
counsel as a matter of federal constitutional law, states continued to expand
the right. As Laura Abel and Max Rettig have catalogued, “states have
passed hundreds of laws and court rules guaranteeing the right to counsel in
a wide variety of civil cases.”71 The development varies from court
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decisions establishing a state constitutional right, to efforts to implement
federal laws applying to specific categories of individuals, to legislative
determinations that providing counsel in a particular type of case is sound
policy.72
The line drawing in these contexts turns on the type of proceeding. As
Abel and Rettig observe, most state right-to-counsel statutes and court rules
fall into three broad categories: “family law matters, involuntary
commitment, and medical treatment.”73 The family law matters typically
include abuse and neglect cases and termination of parental rights cases.
Certain states provide for counsel in domestic violence proceedings, divorce
and annulment proceedings, paternity proceedings, and child custody
proceedings.74 Abel and Rettig also identify a few statutes where the right to
counsel has been given in other areas, including civil arrest or
imprisonment, individuals under disability to sue, and release of mental
health records.75
While Abel and Rettig focus on state statutes, Clare Pastore explores the
expansion of the right through litigation that targets state constitutions.76
After discussing how state courts have treated Lassiter, Pastore turns to the
contexts in which litigants have requested a right to counsel. As with the
state statutory initiatives, her exploration involves categories of
proceedings, with analyses considering as key factors the interests at stake
in the proceeding and the complexity of the process. Termination of
parental rights cases make up the largest number of state court decisions
that provide counsel, but the right is not limited to that context.77 Decisions
also consider the right to counsel involved with civil contempt, civil
commitment for the mentally ill, paternity, and the regulation of minors’
access to abortions.78 While many courts analogize the civil contempt and
civil commitment cases to criminal context involving the loss of—or
restrictions on—physical liberty, a significant number of courts find no
categorical right in the context of civil contempt.79
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In addition to achieving successes in establishing the right to counsel by
state statutes and court rules, advocates and scholars continue to lay the
foundation for expansion into areas not yet recognized by most courts. As
with the expansion under state law, line drawing invariably focuses on
categories of cases. Thus, for example, the literature from the period
covering the first forty years after the Gideon decision set forth the case for
establishing a right to counsel in eviction,80 divorce,81 termination of
parental rights,82 and immigration cases.83
C. Line Drawing in the Recent Initiatives
The 2006 ABA Resolution 112A84 triggered a renewed focus on line
drawing as well. While the resolution does speak in terms of defined
categories (shelter, sustenance, safety, health, and child custody), these
categories are both broad and general in addressing basic human needs, as
evidenced by the use of the phrase “such as” before the five articulated
categories are introduced. Whether the ABA Resolution will prove to be
merely aspirational or point the way to the ultimate formulation of a defined
civil right to counsel remains to be seen. The sweeping language of the
resolution, however, has not eliminated the need to undergo the painful
process of line drawing in many of the initiatives.
While the core areas for proposed expansion retain many of the familiar
contexts for the establishment of the right—such as housing, child custody,
and immigration—many of the initiatives themselves have opened the door
to establishing a right to counsel for a subset of the categories of those
cases. Legislation filed in the New York City Council calls for the
establishment of a right to counsel for senior citizens in eviction and
foreclosure proceedings.85 Initiatives in the immigration area include efforts
to provide a right to counsel for unaccompanied minors facing
deportation.86 The Washington State court rule covering litigants with
disabilities recognizes the appointment of counsel as one of the potential
accommodations that would enable the litigant to achieve meaningful
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access to the courts.87 In Massachusetts, the legislature enacted what is
recognized as a qualified right to counsel for elders facing “appointment of
a guardian, conservator or other protective order” that is triggered not with
the filing of each case, but “if the ward, incapacitated person or person to be
protected or someone on his behalf requests appointment of counsel.”88
Advocates from California, who produced a model statute titled the Equal
Justice Act,89 confronted many of the challenges of line drawing anticipated
by Professor Grey.90 In 2004, the California Access to Justice Commission
created a task force charged with drafting a model statute providing for a
right to counsel in civil cases for those too poor to afford private counsel.91
The task force considered questions regarding the scope of the right,
including whether to extend the right beyond the litigation setting to
administrative agencies.92 The task force also imposed a merits test that
reflected Professor Grey’s distinction between plaintiffs and defendants.
Plaintiffs would be entitled to counsel in scenarios where a reasonable
person with the financial means to employ counsel would likely do so in
light of the costs and potential benefits. The standard was somewhat
broader for defendants, on the theory that they did not choose to initiate the
proceeding; defendants are eligible for services if there is a reasonable
probability of achieving a fair outcome.93
The model statute also articulates exclusions primarily designed to avoid
expanding the right and providing counsel at public expense, where the
private sector is capable of filling the gap or where the proceedings are less
significant. The exclusions include cases involving libel; slander;
defamation; name change; uncontested, childless marriage dissolutions;
property or support; and matters in which representation is available on a
contingent fee basis.94
Perhaps most intriguingly and controversially, the Equal Justice Act
recognizes a range of legal services that might be implicated by the right.
Depending on the scenario, limited legal representation, lay advocacy,
document preparation, and self-help advocacy, might be the level of
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assistance implicated by the right might change.95 The concept of a
spectrum of services as part of the delivery system itself is nothing new and
has been advocated for by many proponents of legal services and advocates
for the poor.96
With the ABA’s passage of Resolution 112A in 2006, the California Task
Force returned to the drafting table to produce a model act tailored to the
language of the ABA’s resolution. Labeled the State Basic Access Act,97 the
act is more limited than the Equal Justice Act in that it defines the scope of
the right in terms of the five categories that the ABA resolution embraces:
shelter, sustenance, safety, health, and child custody.98 The act nonetheless
retains the line drawing from the Equal Justice Act in terms of merits tests,
categorical exclusions, and the potential for the right to be fulfilled by
means short of full representation by counsel.99
The most recent effort to produce a model act is the ABA’s “State Model
Access Act.”100 The Model Access Act seeks to address the financial and
administrative concerns of new rights to counsel. It provides for a right to
counsel only in the five categories of cases specified by the 2006 ABA
resolution as opposed to all civil cases, caps income eligibility at 125
percent of the federal poverty level, and includes several exclusions from
coverage.101 After “extensive and energetic debate,” the ABA House of
Delegates approved the model act and accompanying principles at the
annual meeting in August 2010.102
At first blush, it might seem as if line drawing is more likely to occur in
the legislative context rather than in the litigation context, where advocates
have often sought a sweeping statement of the civil right to counsel. Thus,
petitioners in Kelly v. Warpinski, a custody proceeding in Wisconsin, sought
a formulation of the right to counsel that extended beyond custody
proceedings by asking the Wisconsin Supreme Court to “determine whether
the Wisconsin Constitution accords the right to counsel in civil cases.”103
Likewise, in Frase v. Barnhart,104 Maryland advocates sought an
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articulation of the right to counsel that was broader than that subset of
custody cases. The Appellants’ brief closed with:
Discussion and debate about the details, and the costs, of a suitably
enhanced Maryland program of legal services to the poor are
subjects for another day in another place. They should be
conducted, however, against a judicial finding that a right to
counsel inheres in the Maryland constitution. As Ms. Frase has
demonstrated, she is entitled to such a finding here.105
A careful reading of the way in which these claims for relief have been
raised in recent litigation suggests that line drawing will be inevitable,
regardless of whether the trigger for analysis is litigation or legislation. As
noted above, immigration advocates have used both administrative
advocacy and litigation to try to create a right to counsel for a subset of
claimants, namely unaccompanied minors.106 Moreover, even the litigation
in both Maryland and Washington that seeks to establish a broad-based
right to counsel in private custody disputes, contains seeds for achievement
for just a subset of the broader category of private custody disputes.
In framing the problem in Frase v. Barnhart, advocates for Ms. Frase
hammered on the fundamental unfairness of cases pitting unrepresented
litigants against represented parties.107 While the relief requested in the
appellant’s brief did not suggest drawing lines within the subset of custody
cases, a brief filed by amici ended by encouraging the court to “consider the
inadequacy of services in Maryland in family law disputes . . . [and] require
the State to afford pro se litigants like Ms. Frase full legal representation in
order to protect the fundamental rights at issue.”108 While the court could
have interpreted “pro se litigants like Ms. Frase” to mean all indigent pro se
litigants in custody proceedings, it could also have limited its ruling to
litigants in scenarios such as those presented by Ms. Frase, where she was
pitted against a represented party and ill-equipped to adequately represent
herself for the reasons reflected in the record.
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Tension between the desire to expand the right to an entire category of
cases—or even a subset of those categories—is evident from the briefs in
the Washington case of In re Marriage of King.109 In that case, advocates
unsuccessfully sought to establish a broad-based right, at least in the context
of custody cases. The facts in the record revealed numerous ways in which
Brenda King was on the wrong side of a severe imbalance of power. As the
dissent described at length, Ms. King had little formal education, having left
school in the ninth grade.110 The case involved complex issues, including
expert psychological issues and allegations of domestic violence.111 Ms.
King was unable to obtain representation from the legal services office and
was unable to pay for a private lawyer.112 Not only was her husband
represented by counsel, but the guardian ad litem expressed views adverse
to her, and she was forced to play the roles of party, witness, lawyer, and
scrivener during the emotional and contentious trial.113 The trial court’s
frustration was palpable, and in the end, Ms. King, who had been the
primary caregiver, lost custody of her children.114
Ms. King raised claims under the Washington State Constitution,
including the protection of meaningful access to the courts, the duty to
administer justice impartially, the due process clause, and the privileges and
immunities clause. On appeal, Ms. King’s lawyers also raised federal due
process and equal protection claims.115 While the National Coalition’s
amicus brief discussed the importance of a “categorical” right to counsel,116
Ms. King’s lawyers articulated the possibility that, should Ms. King prevail,
the established right might fall short of representation by counsel for all
indigent litigants in custody. Thus, her attorneys identified factors to be
considered in determining which litigants should receive full representation
by counsel, arguing that “[a]t a minimum, counsel should be appointed . . .
when (a) the proceeding is adversarial; (b) critical interests are at stake; (c)
the unrepresented litigant is indigent and has made reasonable, but
unsuccessful, efforts to obtain counsel; and (d) the unrepresented litigant is
unable to adequately or effectively advocate for his or her interests.”117 By
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implication, the right to access might mean a lesser form of assistance
where the factors were not present. The relief sought on appeal was reversal
and remand “for a new trial with instructions for the Superior Court to
provide counsel for Brenda King,” not a categorical declaration.118
Whether a court were to draw the lines itself or leave the matter to the
legislature and whether the litigants seek a broad formulation of the right or
suggest ways in which it might be tailored, the drawing of lines is
inevitable. The line drawing might occur between categories or within
categories, but it likely will be based on the same types of considerations
that advocates, scholars, and courts have considered in analyzing the
development of existing rights and charting possible courses for expansion.
The next section returns to the process of line drawing, suggesting that a
key component to the puzzle is strategic: what if the questions were not
defined by a vision of the final landscape of the right to counsel, but rather
the consideration of the scenarios that might most successfully present
starting points or beachheads for moving forward?

III. LINE DRAWING AS A STRATEGY
Many of the examples of line drawing above share a common approach:
they seek to envision the ultimate landscape by setting forth categories at
the outset that will likely define the scenarios in which the right to counsel
should attach. Whatever the benefits are in having clear terms to identify the
scenarios in which the right to counsel should exist, the reality is that we are
approaching the fiftieth anniversary of Gideon, and only minimal progress
has been made to expand the right to counsel beyond the scenarios
recognized by state statutes and courts in the 1970s and 1980s. This reality
suggests that we should try a different approach and instead explore the
challenge of line drawing not with an eye toward the final landscape,
however just and compelling as it may be, but with an eye toward starting
points on which to build momentum. Although Professor Grey focused on a
litigation strategy leading to an unqualified right to counsel, he recognized
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the need to start with a small number of cases—with resting points—as the
right expands.119
The notion of identifying likely starting points in an incremental strategy
for broader expansion is hardly new. The strategy that led to Brown v.
Board of Education is a familiar story to many; it targeted graduate schools
and built toward public elementary schools over a journey that stretched for
roughly thirty years. That strategy carried with it the belief that victory in
one context would not limit the right to only that context but sow the seeds
for expansion.120 The path to a right to appointed counsel in the criminal
context, from Powell to Gideon and its progeny, never reflected the belief
that the right should be limited to each new context, but that the case
pending was compelling and might lay the foundation for future expansion.
The same is undoubtedly true with immigration efforts focused on
unaccompanied minors, eviction or foreclosure cases in New York City
focused on elders, and Washington’s court rule focused on disabled
litigants. Advocates do not pursue those strategies because they believe the
right should be limited to those contexts, but because they present
compelling starting points.
This section discusses both a framework for beginning the process of
identifying starting points and the manner in which existing data might be
useful in the process. It concludes by discussing experiments under way in
Massachusetts and the process that led to those experiments, before
identifying scenarios that might lend themselves to the most promising
starting points.
A. A Framework for Decision Making
A civil right to counsel should, therefore, be developed as a component to
a coherent access to justice strategy.121 I have articulated elsewhere a threepronged approach:
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1. the expansion of the roles of the court system’s key players—such
as judges, court-connected mediators, and clerks—to require them
to assist unrepresented litigants as necessary to prevent a forfeiture
of important rights;
2. the use of assistance programs, rigorously evaluated to identify
which programs most effectively protect litigants from the
forfeiture of rights; and
3. the adoption of a civil right to counsel where the expansion of the
roles of the key players and assistance programs do not provide the
necessary help to vulnerable litigants.122
With regard to Prong 1, I have explored the need and justification for a
revision of the roles of the key players.123 The rules implicating the analysis
are general, and the standard application of the rules governing judges,
mediators, and clerks in fact patterns that confront the court personnel daily
depends on the custom established in court, not the text of the rules. While
judges and clerks historically viewed their roles toward unrepresented
litigants passively, the past decade has seen a shift in attitudes. Conferences,
trainings, access to justice resolutions, and the work of state access to
justice commissions accelerated these trends.124
The need to revise the roles of key players flows from needs of the
litigants—consumers of the courts—appearing without counsel in vast
numbers.125 The underlying goals of our justice system are to be fair and
just. The ethical rules shaping the roles of the players in the adversary
system imply that unrepresented litigants are the exception. Given the
realities of many of our courts, our traditional understanding of these roles
frustrates rather than furthers the goals of fairness and justice. As between
abandoning the goal and changing the roles, we should change the roles.
The focus on fairness and justice, in substance and not simply
appearance, requires shifting the approach to cases involving unrepresented
litigants. We must revise our understanding of what it means to be impartial
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and reject the idea that impartiality equals passivity.126 A system favoring
those with lawyers, without regard to the law and facts, is a partial, not
impartial, system. Judges, court-connected mediators, and clerks must play
an active role to maintain the system’s impartiality and ensure that
unrepresented litigants do not forfeit rights due to the absence of counsel.127
Access to justice or equal justice initiatives speak in sweeping terms
consistent with Prong 1. Thus, the Conference of Chief Justices (CCJ)
promulgated Resolution 23, titled “Leadership to Promote Equal Justice,”
which resolved in part to “[r]emove impediments to access to the justice
system, including physical, economic, psychological and language
barriers.”128 In 2002, the CCJ and Conference of State Court Administrators
(COSCA) resolved that “courts have an affirmative obligation to ensure that
all litigants have meaningful access to the courts, regardless of [their]
representation status.”129
Prong 2 captures an array of assistance programs beyond the work of
court personnel but short of full representation by counsel. Telephone
hotlines, self-help centers, pro se offices, advice-only clinics, and courtannexed limited legal services programs all assist unrepresented litigants in
the courts.130 These innovative programs are an important component in the
strategy to increase access to justice. Yet, a comprehensive access to justice
strategy requires that we evaluate assistance programs carefully. Evaluation
tools must identify which programs help stem the forfeiture of rights and
which only help the courts run more smoothly, without affecting case
outcomes.131 Programs not affecting case outcomes may be worthwhile, but
they are not a solution to the problem of the forfeiture of rights due to the
absence of counsel.
When revising the roles of judges, mediators, and clerks and when using
assistance programs short of full representation, we can no longer accept the
denial of access and routine forfeiture of rights as acceptable outcomes. In
those instances, we must recognize and establish a right to appointed
counsel in civil cases. The scope of the right to counsel is directly
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dependent on the effectiveness of the first two prongs in the access to
justice program. The more that judges, mediators, clerks, and assistance
programs are effective in stemming the forfeiture of rights due to the
absence of counsel, the smaller the pool of cases will be in which counsel is
needed. Where nothing short of full representation can provide the needed
assistance, the right to counsel must attach.
B. Using Data to Inform Line Drawing
The framework for access to justice initiatives should be informed not
only by the existing data but also by the identification of research agendas
that can help fill gaps in that existing data. Many reports from across the
country explore the impact of counsel in various settings that handle civil
cases.132 Reports consistently show that representation is a significant
variable affecting a claimant’s chances for success in eviction, custody, and
debt collection cases, as well as administrative proceedings. Rebecca
Sandefur’s meta-analysis of studies on the effects of representation reports
that “parties represented by lawyers are between 17 percent more likely and
1380 percent more likely to receive favorable outcomes in adjudication than
are parties appearing pro se.”133
While the presence of counsel can dramatically affect case outcomes, that
factor is only one variable. Other key variables include the substantive law,
the complexity of the procedures, the individual judges, and the overall
operation of the forum. The data show that the greater the imbalance of
power between the parties, the more likely it is that extensive assistance will
be necessary to impact the case outcome. That power or powerlessness can
derive from the substantive or procedural law, the judge, or the operation of
the forum. Disparities in economic resources, barriers such as those due to
race, ethnicity, disability, and language, and the presence of counsel for
only one side can affect the calculus as well. The greater the imbalance of
power is, the greater the need for a skilled advocate with expertise in the
forum to provide needed help.134
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While gaps in our knowledge suggest the need for additional research,
the stakes for unrepresented litigants are too high for us to refrain from
acting. Where we can already identify likely starting points for reform, the
price of delay outweighs the costs of uncertainty. As we continue to
evaluate existing and new programs, developing and considering additional
data will provide critical information in helping to identify the most
important starting points and the manner in which to respond to those areas
of need.
C. Using Experimentation to Inform Line Drawing
1. The Process of Sorting
Given the importance of identifying starting points, it is helpful to
identify discrete steps to undertake in moving the analysis along. An
unwillingness to begin with incremental steps runs the risk of achieving no
movement at all, as the initiatives get stalled by concerns about the ultimate
landscape, or opportunities for potential gains are passed over because of
the enormity of the task of achieving a more broad-based right. One
approach for identifying starting points is the seven-step strategy I
presented at the 2010 Washington Conference and have developed
elsewhere:
1. Identify likely areas in which counsel is most needed.
2. Review available data.
3. Put 1 and 2 together. This step involves matching each area
identified in Step 1 with available data on the impact of
representation in Step 2 to identify core areas in which data
demonstrates the importance of counsel. Some areas, such as small
claims cases—in which counsel has a big impact—may drop back
if the interest at stake does not involve a core area from Step 1.
Others, such as eviction cases and custody cases, may move
forward—but not necessarily for the entire docket—absent
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4.

5.
6.
7.

evidence that power imbalances seem to be extreme across the
board.
Identify areas of consensus. The process of Steps 1 through 3
might produce a list of potential areas where the interest at stake is
important and data demonstrates the impact of counsel. However,
there might not be consensus in a jurisdiction on the wisdom of
moving forward on each area remaining on the list. Since the effort
to achieve an expanded civil right to counsel must be recognized as
intensely political, Step 4 urges that a promising starting point
include areas around which there is consensus.
Obtain estimates as to the volume of cases involved.
Identify existing resources.
Identify the best delivery mechanism where new resources are
needed.135

Steps such as these allow access to justice communities to begin the
difficult but essential process of sorting through specific challenges facing
the delivery system. The process of sorting the most ripe cases for an
expansion of a right to counsel (Prong 3) necessarily entails leaving entire
categories of cases, and subsets of other categories, to a form of assistance
less than full representation. However, with a civil right to counsel
understood as a component of a larger strategy, the full panoply of options
is available, including expanding the roles of key players in the court
system (Prong 1) and expanding assistance programs (Prong 2). The full
array of access to justice initiatives remains particularly essential to
scenarios that do not make the first cut for potential starting points. The
focus on data requires a more disciplined analysis of the scope of the
problem need by need, court by court, or group by group. The emphasis on
evaluation encourages experimentation, but with an eye toward measuring
the effectiveness of the assistance received in terms of case outcome, rather
than accepting the mere fact of assistance as sufficient.
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2. The Massachusetts Pilot Projects
Advocates in Massachusetts began the process of experimentation and
line drawing through the work of the BBA Task Force on Expanding the
Civil Right to Counsel. Created in 2007 in response to the adoption of ABA
Resolution 112A (and including members from key statewide leaders in the
legal community), the Task Force used a process similar to the seven-step
approach to identify subject areas by pairing basic human needs with
evidence of the impact of counsel in order to yield starting points in the
areas of housing, family, juvenile, and immigration law.136
In the area of housing, the Task Force obtained input from judges and
advocates, in addition to collecting statistics and relevant data regarding
summary process (eviction) cases in housing and district courts—the two
types of courts in Massachusetts that handle these cases. To assist
unrepresented litigants, the Task Force committee members also read
reports and data from around the country on housing, eviction, and
homelessness, in addition to interviewing advocates and court personnel
about existing programs.
The survey responses, while often indicating a preference for providing
representation for all unrepresented tenants, identified scenarios in which
the power lined up against the unrepresented litigant was overwhelming,
such as evictions related to criminal conduct, scenarios in which
governmental agencies were involved in the eviction, or cases in which the
litigants were particularly vulnerable. As the Task Force worked to identify
discrete areas for representation around which a feasible pilot project could
be constructed, tensions emerged with respect to the role of discretion in
screening cases, the need to provide some form of assistance for cases not
accepted for full representation, and the reality that the housing courts
already possessed certain resources (such as Housing Specialists and
Tenancy Preservation Projects) that do not exist in the district courts. A
final tension involved the potential imbalance in any representation
proposal regarding assistance for landlords and tenants.137
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After weighing the input from all sources and considering the various
tensions raised, the Task Force settled on pilot projects which would
eventually be launched in one housing court and one district court.138 As the
report explained, the representation proposal resolved the tension between
discrete categories and the need for discretion by identifying two specific
categories, plus a carefully subscribed discretionary category guided by six
explicit factors. The first subsection focuses on potentially the most
vulnerable tenants—those with mental disabilities. The second subsection
responds to the concerns where criminal behavior is at risk, thus avoiding
the anomalous and inefficient situation in which representation is available
by right in the criminal context, but not for the related eviction. Subsection
three was crafted to guide the careful exercise of discretion—it requires
consideration not only of the tenant’s vulnerability, but focuses further on
cases in which the landlord is represented, the housing is affordable, and the
tenant has potentially meritorious claims and defenses.139 On the landlord’s
side, the goals remained to provide representation for indigent litigants
where shelter is at stake and the opposing party is represented. Finally,
regarding the tension between crafting a representation proposal and
furthering the goal of obtaining at least some assistance for all tenants, the
proposal endorses the expanded use of assistance programs throughout the
state.140
Despite the bleak economic picture, proposals urged by the Task Force
moved forward, even if more slowly than was hoped for. Task Force leaders
obtained funding to launch Civil Gideon eviction defense pilot projects in
the Quincy District Court and the Northeast Housing Court. Because a staffbased model was selected, the project had the dual effect of launching the
first pilot projects and cushioning further legal services layoffs.141 The pilot
projects were scheduled to run for a year, beginning in May 2009. The
projects were supported by forms of evaluation that included analysis of a
randomized study, assessment of the court dockets, efforts to follow
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litigants after the period of the study, and interviews with judges, advocates,
and other personnel involved.142
In the area of family law, the Task Force’s work coincided with reforms
of the guardianship laws that included the establishment in 2009, by statute,
of a right to counsel for elderly people facing guardianship petitions.143 In
the custody area, data collection was key to moving the ball forward.
Informal analysis of the dockets in both probate and family courts suggested
that the number of custody cases pitting an indigent, unrepresented party
against a represented one was smaller than anticipated. This revelation led
to renewed planning for a pilot project for this subset of custody cases.144 In
the area of immigration, the private pro bono project “KIND” (Kids in Need
of Defense), supported by Microsoft, has collaborated with Greater Boston
Legal Services to provide representation for unaccompanied minors in
deportation proceedings.145
3. Other Experimentation
The Massachusetts pilot projects left the gates first, but they are not the
only example of states experimenting with line drawing. The landmark
California legislation did not establish a right to counsel, but rather a
funding stream to set up pilot projects in support of such a right. Thus, the
bill provides that it:
. . . would state the intent of the Legislature to expand the
availability of legal counsel in critical civil matters through locally
controlled pilot programs designed to test and evaluate new
methods for the fair and cost-efficient resolution of legal disputes,
and the comprehensive enforcement of vital legal rights, with
respect to basic human needs. The bill would state the additional
intent of the Legislature to encourage the legal profession to make
further efforts to meet its professional responsibilities and other
obligations by providing pro bono legal services and financial
support of nonprofit legal organizations that provide free legal
services to underserved communities.146
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The process involves a significant amount of time, planning, and
establishing criteria for the pilot projects before they are launched and
evaluated.147 The Texas Access to Justice Foundation recently funded two
pilot projects: one providing for counsel in nonjudicial foreclosure cases
and the other in eviction defense cases.148
In a separate initiative, Michael Finigan, Director of Policy Research of
Northwest Professional Consortium Research, presented the Civil Right to
Counsel Pilot Study Preliminary Results at the Seattle University School of
Law Symposium in February 2010.149 Following the day-long conference
entitled “Civil Legal Representation and Access to Justice,” key members
of the Washington access to justice community convened in a working
session “to arrive at consensus on fundamental principles of a right to civil
representation by counsel in Washington” and to “identify next steps toward
achieving the goals reflected in the statement of principles.”150
D. Drawing the Line by Identifying Starting Points
The preceding analysis suggests clues as to the types of scenarios that
will yield promising starting points for expanding a civil right to counsel.
We know that likely subjects will involve the types of basic human needs
described in the ABA Resolution: shelter, sustenance, safety, health, and
child custody.151 This section discusses the realities of the dynamics of
power, politics, the need for beachheads, and the dynamic nature of the
process that might lead to an expanded right to counsel. However wise a
particular strategy may seem on the drawing board, these realities will
demonstrate the need for flexibility and opportunism along the way.
1. Power Dynamics
From the available studies of courts, we know that the greater the power
imbalance between parties, the greater the level of intervention will be
needed for assistance. That dynamic commonly occurs in a variety of cases.
Eviction cases pit vulnerable tenants against powerful landlords. Victims of
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domestic violence fighting their abusers in custody proceedings are
vulnerable as well, particularly where counsel represents the opposing
party. The results from surveys of judges demonstrate that scenarios pitting
an unrepresented party against a represented one are the most difficult for
judges to handle,152 so solutions from Prong 1 of the comprehensive
strategy are unlikely to be effective. Early reports from triage efforts of selfhelp centers suggest that these are the cases in most need of referrals too.153
The concept of identifying power imbalances provided one of the
“common threads” that emerged in the BBA Task Force’s selection of pilot
projects. As the Report explains, some of the pilots flowed from scenarios
that were closely analogous to the criminal context—where physical liberty
was at stake—while others “involved the potential loss of basic human
needs due to a dramatic power imbalance.”154 Those power imbalances
often flowed from the vulnerability of a family whose basic needs are in
jeopardy, as well as the comparative power of an adverse party.”155
2. Politics and Beachheads
While the identification of power imbalances is a promising and
compelling area for expansion, the methodical process described above
need not be pursued at the expense of other initiatives. At the Symposium
“Civil Legal Representation and Access to Justice” in Washington State,
Laura Abel discussed the dynamic nature of the process, including twelve
examples of recent state statutes expanding the right to counsel in civil
cases.156 Statutes in the areas of termination of parental rights, child abuse
and neglect, special immigrant juvenile status, child custody, and
guardianship come from states such as Arkansas, Hawaii, Montana, New
York, and Texas.157
Litigation has yielded some success as well. The Massachusetts Supreme
Judicial Court extended the right to counsel to parents at the dispositional
phase of a CHINS (children in need of services) proceeding if the judge is
considering awarding custody to the Department of Social Services.158 In
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Alaska, litigation led to the appointment of counsel for an indigent parent in
a private custody dispute.159
Decisions to pursue legislation or litigation should include a political
calculation involving the chances of success and the risks of failure. Failure
on the legislative front is less dangerous, since an adverse court decision
could result in long-term harm because of the power of precedent. The
political nature of the calculation is evident in the seven-step approach, as
well, which suggests moving ahead to compelling areas where there is
consensus. Political issues, such as the foreclosure crisis and immigration
reform, as well as moments of change in priorities or elected officials in the
political arena, might yield opportunities to press the case.160 As Chief
Judge Lippmann’s recent efforts in New York illustrate,161 the advent of
strong leadership might allow for a more aggressive response to the
problem than might previously have been thought feasible.
3. The Dynamic Nature of the Process Applied to the Comprehensive
Strategy
The dynamic nature of the process is evident in both the legislative and
litigation successes, as well as the broader access to justice strategy
articulated in this article. The need for a right to counsel (Prong 3) is tied
directly to the effectiveness of the efforts of the court system and assistance
programs short of full representation (Prongs 1 and 2). The better the job
that the courts do in providing meaningful access, and the more successful
limited assistance programs are in affecting case outcomes, the smaller the
pool of cases needing counsel.
Yet, those initiatives are dynamic as well. As noted above, in the past
decade, those in the court system have significantly changed their approach
in cases involve unrepresented litigants. As more judges, court-connected
mediators, and clerks accept as part of their role the need to provide
meaningful access—and as their supervisors consider those goals in hiring,
training, and administrative directives they promulgate—the courts may
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become increasingly more effective in delivering access. Richard Zorza’s
recent call for transforming the courts into access to justice institutions
provides one vision of the types of potential changes.162 As successes are
communicated from court to court and state to state, and as techniques are
refined, the process will accelerate.
The experimentation, evaluation, and sharing of assistance programs is
comparatively new. While legal services programs have been involved in
self-help initiatives for years, the focus beyond those programs is a
relatively recent event. Evaluation techniques are even less refined.
Programs involving unbundling163 and limited representation are among the
newer forms, underscoring the dynamic nature of program evolution, but
rendering an even more complicated evaluation and comparison as we
analyze the differences among programs.164 As with Prong 1, the successes
we discover with Prong 2 in providing meaningful access with limited
assistance will have a direct impact on the scenarios in which full
representation seems to be the only meaningful form of assistance.
Apart from the development of new techniques and programs, the
evolution of our values and political priorities will affect the expansion of
the right to counsel. The language of the ABA Resolution underscores the
nature in which the five listed categories are examples of basic human needs
in need of protection by counsel.165 Changes in the substantive law
involving healthcare or foreclosure might similarly yield compelling
scenarios for expanding the right to counsel. Changes in the procedures of
any of our administrative agencies, whose decisions directly and indirectly
impact the rights of low-income litigants, will affect the scope of the right
as well. Changes that help claimants obtain their needed benefits or relief
through the agency process will reduce the need for counsel. Changes that
increase the procedural and substantive hurdles will add pressure for an
expanded right to counsel to additional areas, scenarios, and litigants.166
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CONCLUSION
In its Executive Summary, the Massachusetts BBA Task Force
confronted the most common objections to moving forward on an expanded
right to counsel:
For too long, the concept of recognizing a civil Gideon has been
resisted due to fears that do not comport with the reality of the
concept. The concept of a civil Gideon, as understood by members
of this Task Force, stands for the basic proposition that where a
civil proceeding involves a basic need or right, and nothing short
of representation by counsel will preserve that right, counsel must
be provided. No one is calling for a lawyer for all litigants in all
civil matters. No one is calling for representation by counsel when
lesser forms of assistance will do. No one is calling for
representation where the rights at issue do not involve basic human
needs.167
With the fiftieth anniversary of Gideon approaching and the pool of
unrepresented litigants and unmet needs expanding in the face of an
economic downturn, the need to achieve progress in the quest for an
expanded civil right to counsel has never been greater. As this article has
explored, understanding the civil right to counsel as a component of a
broader access to justice strategy—and maintaining a disciplined focus on
scenarios involving power imbalances that reflect a breakdown of our
adversary system’s proper functioning—are essential pieces to the puzzle.
Mining existing data and creating opportunities to enhance our evaluation
efforts, and in turn, enriching our understanding of the scenarios in which
counsel is most needed, are key components as well. The success of an
expanded right to counsel movement might turn less on the ultimate vision
of that right and more on the success of finding starting points.
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http://www.ajs.org/prose/pro_greacen.asp; Albrecht, supra note 18.
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See, e.g., Houseman, supra note 11, at 40–43; Justice for All, supra note 12, at 2000–1.
See supra note 18, for resources available on the web.
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See, e.g., NAT’L CONF. OF STATE COURT ADM’RS, POSITION PAPER ON SELFREPRESENTED LITIGATION (Aug. 2000), available at http//costa.ncsc.dni.
us/WhitePapers/selfrepresentation.pdf (calling on the courts to provide access to justice
for those without counsel); See CONF. OF CHIEF JUSTICES, RES. 23: LEADERSHIP TO
PROMOTE
EQUAL
JUSTICE
(January
21,
2001),
available
at
http://ccj.ncsc.dni.us/AccessToJusticeResolutions/resol23Leadership.html (resolving in
part to “[r]emove impediments to access to the justice system, including physical,
economic, psychological and language barriers.”); see CONF. OF CHIEF JUSTICES, RES.
31: IN SUPPORT OF A LEADERSHIP ROLE FOR CCJ AND COSCA IN THE DEVELOPMENT,
IMPLEMENTATION AND COORDINATION OF ASSISTANCE PROGRAMS FOR SELFREPRESENTED LITIGANTS (Aug. 1, 2002), available at
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See, e.g., EASTERN REGIONAL CONFERENCE, supra note 18; NEW YORK STATE
UNIFIED COURT SYSTEM, supra note 18.
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Karla M. Gray & Robert Echols, Mobilizing Lawyers, Judges and Communities: State
Access to Justice Commissions, 47 No. 3 JUDGES J. 33 (2008). Although only five states
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June, 2006. More than a dozen additional states had an active committee of the state bar
or bar association that is charged with the broad access to justice function. See Access to
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id.
25
Id.
26
Bos. Bar Ass’n, Gideon’s New Trumpet: Expanding the Civil Right to Counsel in
Massachusetts (2008) [hereinafter Gideon’s New Trumpet], available at
http://www.bostonbar.org/prs/nr_0809/GideonsNewTrumpet.pdf. See Kelsey Sadoff,
Civil Gideon Symposium Mobilizes Legal Community, 15 MASS. BAR. ASSOC. LAW. J. 3,
at 6 (Nov. 2007), available at
http://www.massbar.org/media/228975/nov%2007.pdf, for a description of the joint
Boston Bar Association (BBA) and Massachusetts Bar Association conference to begin
implementing the resolution.
27
See Pastore, supra note 7. The two model statutes are The State Equal Justice Act
(2006), available at http://www.brennancenter.org/page/-/d/download_file_38656.pdf;
and The State Basic Access Act (2008), available at
http://brennan.3cdn.net/c8d7c0be3acc133d7a_s8m6ii3y0.pdf.
28
See Carol J. Williams, California gives the poor a new legal right, L.A. TIMES, Oct.
17, 2009, available at http://www.latimes.com/news/local/la-me-civil-gideon172009oct17,0,7682738.story. Assembly Bill 590, creating the pilot projects, was signed
into law by Governor Schwarzenegger on October 11, 2009. A.B. 590, 2009-10 Leg.,
Reg. Sess. (Cal. 2009), available at http://leginfo.ca.gov/pub/09-10/bill/asm/ab_05510600/ab_590_bill_20091011_chaptered.pdf. See also Note, California Establishes Pilot
Programs to Expand Access to Counsel for Low-Income Parties, 123 HARV. L. REV.
1532 (2010). See generally The State Equal Justice Act, supra note 27; The State Basic
Act, supra note 27.
29
See Stephen H. Sachs, Keynoted Address: Seeking a Right to Counsel in Appointed
Civil Cases in Maryland, 37 U. BALT. L. REV. 21 (2007).
30
Phila. Bar Ass’n, Resolution Calling for the Provisions of Legal Counsel for Indigent
Persons in Civil Matters Where Basic Human Needs Are at Stake (Apr. 30, 2009),
available at
http://www.pabar.org/public/probono/PhiladelphiaBarCivil%20Gideon%20Resolution430-09.pdf.
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The proceedings and related articles are published in the Symposium volume, An
Obvious Truth: Creating an Action Blueprint for a Civil Right to Counsel in New York
State, 25 TOURO L. REV. 1 (2009).
32
See Jonathan Lippman, Chief Judge, N. Y. Ct. App., Address before the Central
Synagogue of New York: Justice Shall You Pursue: The Chief Judge’s Perspective on
Justice and Jewish Values (Feb. 5, 2010) (on file with author) (“The time has come for
New York State to make good on its promise of Gideon and ensure that there is a right to
counsel at public expense in at least those cases where basic human needs are at stake,
like shelter, sustenance, safety, health and children.”); see Daniel Wise, Lippman Names
28 to Task Force to Expand Access to Legal Services, N.Y. L.J., June 10, 2010, available
at http://www.law.com/jsp/nylj/PubArticleNY.jsp?id=1202462459386&Lippman_Names
__to_Task_Force_to_Expand_Access_to_Legal_Services&slreturn=1&hbxlogin=1,
regarding the creation of the task force.
33
See, e.g., New York State Unified Court System, supra note 18; see An Obvious Truth,
supra note 31, for a summary of the proceedings at the New York conference;
Symposium, Civil Legal Representation and Access to Justice: Breaking Point or
Opportunity to Change (Feb. 19, 2010),
http://www.law.seattleu.edu/Continuing_Legal_Education/Event_Archives/2010/Korema
tsu.xml (last visited Oct. 8, 2010) (The symposium was jointly sponsored by the
Korematsu Center for Law and Equality at Seattle University School of Law, University
of Washington School of Law, and Gonzaga University School of Law.); Justice Earl
Johnson, Jr., Three Phases of Justice for the Poor: From Charity to Discretion to Right,
Address Before the Pathways to Justice Conference (June 7, 2008), in 42
CLEARINGHOUSE REV. 486 (Jan.–Feb. 2009); see also Robert J. Derocher, Access to
Justice: Is Civil Gideon a Piece of the Puzzle?, B. LEADER 11 (A.B.A., July–Aug. 2008).
34
See, e.g., Debra Garnder, Pursuing a Right to Counsel in Civil Cases: Introduction and
Overview, 40 CLEARINGHOUSE REV 167, 169 (2006).
35
See John Pollack, Getting Off the Ground: Addressing Implementation of a Right to
Counsel in Civil Cases, XIV(2) MGMT. INFO. EXCH. 6 (2010) (describing the struggle in
the drafting and approval process of the Model Act to provide for lesser forms of
assistance than full representation, but then to insert both a requirement that the impact be
equivalent and a presumption that the lesser forms are insufficient).
36
See e.g., Lonnie Powers et al., Key Questions and Considerations Involved in State
Deliberations Concerning an Expanded Civil Right to Counsel, XXIV(2) MGMT. INFO.
EXCH. 16 (2010).
37
The current economic crisis, with its attendant problems of high unemployment, home
foreclosures and family stress, has resulted in legal problems relating to consumer credit,
housing, employment, bankruptcies, domestic violence and child support, and has pushed
many families into poverty for the first time. LEGAL SERVS. CORP., DOCUMENTING THE
JUSTICE GAP IN AMERICA: THE CURRENT UNMET CIVIL LEGAL NEEDS OF LOW-INCOME
AMERICANS, AN UPDATED REPORT OF THE LEGAL SERVICES CORPORATION 5 (Sept.
2009) [hereinafter THE JUSTICE GAP, UPDATED REPORT], available at
http://www.lsc.gov/pdfs/documenting_the_justice_gap_in_america_2009.pdf.
38
See, e.g., David Riley, Free Legal Services Suffering as Demand Rises, METROWEST
DAILY NEWS, June 28, 2009 (describing increased demand for legal services, combined
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with cutbacks affecting legal services offices in Massachusetts, including MetroWest
Legal Services), available at http://www.metrowestdailynews.com/news/x768070132/
Free-legal-services-suffering-as-demand-rises; Jimmie E. Gates, Legal Program for Poor
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JUSTICE GAP, UPDATED REPORT, supra note 37.
40
Id.
41
See generally Marvy, supra note 4.
42
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43
Id. at 182.
44
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Working for a Sort-of Gideon, on the Civil Side, 20 DE NOVO, THE OFFICIAL PUBL’N OF
THE WASH. ST. B. ASS’N YOUNG LAW. DIVISION 4 (2006), available at
http://www.wsba.org/media/publications/denovo/0406denovo.pdf.
45
See, e.g., Marvy, supra note 4; Deborah Perluss, Keeping the Eyes on the Prize:
Visualizing the Civil Right to Counsel, 15 TEMP. POL. & CIV. RTS. L. REV. 719 (2006);
James A. Bamberger, Confirming the Constitutional Right of Meaningful Access to the
Courts in Non-Criminal Cases in Washington State, 4 SEATTLE J. FOR SOC. JUST. 383
(2005); Deborah Perluss, Washington’s Constitutional Right to Counsel in Civil Cases:
Access to Justice v. Fundamental Interest, 2 SEATTLE J. FOR SOC. JUST. 571 (2004).
46
See, e.g., Bellevue Sch. Dist. v. E.S., 199 P.3d 1010 (Wash. Ct. App. 2009); In re
Custody of Halls, 109 P.3d 15 (Wash. Ct. App. 2005); City of Moses Lake v. Smith, No.
01-2-00766-8 (Wash. Superior Ct., Grant Cty.); King v. King, 174 P.3d 659 (Wash.
2007); Machado v. Ashcroft, No. CS-02-0066-FVS (E. D. Wash., filed June 18, 2002);
Marvy, supra note 4, at 182–85.
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WASH. GEN. APPLICATION CT. R. 33(a)(1)(c) (Requests for Accommodation by
Persons with Disabilities).
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Testy, supra note 48.
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See Symposium, supra note 33 (Chief Justice Barbara Madsen delivered the keynote
address). The Conference materials are available online at
http://civilrighttocounsel.org/news/recent_developments/38.
51
Gideon, 372 U.S. at 342 (incorporating the Sixth Amendment into the Due Process
Clause in felony cases), overruling Betts v. Brady, 316 U.S. 455 (1942) (concluding that
the Sixth Amendment's guarantee of counsel is not one of these fundamental rights).
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See generally Lassiter v. Dept. of Soc. Services, 452 U.S. 18 (1981) (holding that the
due process clause does not require appointment of counsel for indigent parents in all
termination of parental rights cases).
53
Note, The Indigent’s Right to Counsel in Civil Cases, 76 YALE L.J. 545 (1967).
Although the note itself does not reflect Professor Grey’s authorship, Justice Fuchsberg
made the connection in his dissent in the landmark New York case, In re Smiley,
referring to this article as the “now classic Note [of] Stanford University Law Professor
Thomas Grey.” In re Smiley, 36 N.Y.2d 433, n.6 (1975) (Fuchsberg, J., dissenting).
54
The Indigent’s Right to Counsel in Civil Cases, supra note 53, at 549.
55
Id. at 547–51.
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See generally Betts v. Brady, 316 U.S. 455 (1942).
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The Indigent’s Right to Counsel in Civil Cases, supra note 53, at 553.
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Id. at 553–54.
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Id. at 555.
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Id. at 556.
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Id. at 556–58.
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Id. at 552.
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Id.
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See generally Powell v. Alabama, 287 U.S. 45 (1932).
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See generally Betts, supra note 56.
67
See generally Douglas v. California, 372 U.S. 363 (1963).
68
Benjamin H. Barton, Against Civil Gideon (and for Pro Se Court Reform), 62
FLORIDA L REV. 1227 (2010).
69
Id. at 1238-41.
70
Id. at 1251-62.
71
Laura K. Abel & Max Rettig, State Statutes Providing for a Right to Counsel in Civil
Cases, 40 CLEARINGHOUSE REV. 245 (July-August 2006).
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73
Id.
74
Id. at 245–46.
75
Id. at 247–48.
76
Clare Pastore, Life After Lassiter: An Overview of State-Court Right-to-Counsel
Decisions, 40 CLEARINGHOUSE REV. 186 (2006).
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Id. at 190.
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Id. at 190–91.
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Id. at 190.
80
See, e.g., Andrew Scherer, Why People Who Face Losing Their Homes in Legal
Proceedings Must Have a Right to Counsel, 3 CARDOZO PUB. L. POL’Y & ETHICS 699
(2006); Rachel Kleinman, Comment, Housing Gideon: The Right to Counsel in Eviction
Cases, 31 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 1507 (2004); see also Andrew Scherer, Gideon’s Shelter:
The Need to Recognize a Right to Counsel for Indigent Defendants in Eviction
Proceedings, 23 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 557 (1988); Frances E. Werner, Toward a
Right to Counsel for Indigent Tenants in Eviction Proceedings, NAT’L HOUS. LAW
PROJECT HOUSING L. BULL (Sept.-Oct.1987).
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Options=ID|Text|Attachments|&Search=648; See also Manny Fernandez, Free Legal Aid
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Nov.
16,
2007,
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for
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N.Y.
http://www.nytimes.com/2007/11/16/nyregion/16housing.html.
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For example, in Massachusetts, the private pro bono project “KIND” (Kids in Need of
Defense), supported by Microsoft, has collaborated with Greater Boston Legal Services
to provide representation for unaccompanied minors in deportation proceedings. Articles
describing the KIND project are available on the project’s website at
http://www.supportkind.org/. The project involves a collaboration between Microsoft and
Angelina Jolie, among others. See., e.g., 'Kids in Need of Defense' (KIND) Launched by
Microsoft, Angelina Jolie, Major Law Firms and Corporate Legal Departments
HISPANIC BUS. (Oct. 17, 2008), available at
http://www.hispanicbusiness.com/pr_newswire/2008/10/17/kids_in_need_of_defense_ki
nd.htm [hereinafter Kids in Need of Defense].
87
WASH. GEN. APPLICATION CT. R., supra note 47.
88
See MASS. GEN. LAWS ch. 109B, § 5-106 (2009):
After filing of a petition for appointment of a guardian, conservator or other
protective order, if the ward, incapacitated person or person to be protected or
someone on his behalf requests appointment of counsel; or if the court
determines at any time in the proceeding that the interests of the ward,
incapacitated person or person to be protected are or may be inadequately
represented, the court shall appoint an attorney to represent the person, giving
consideration to the choice of the person if 14 or more years of age. Id.
89
The State Equal Justice Act, supra note 27.
90
The Indigent’s Right to Counsel in Civil Cases, supra note 53.
91
See generally Pastore, supra note 7.
92
See Pastore, supra note 7, at 178; The State Equal Justice Act, supra note 27, at §§301,
305 (regarding Full Public Legal Representation, and Non-lawyer Representation,
respectively, both using the term “forum” to include context beyond the courts.).
93
See Pastore, supra note 7, at 178; The State Model Act, supra note 27, at §§ 301.1,
301.2.
94
See Pastore, supra note 7, at 178–79; The State Equal Justice Act, supra note 27, at
§301.4.
95
See Pastore, supra note 7, at 178; THE State Equal Justice Act, supra note 27, at
§§302–06.
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See e.g., Alan W. Houseman, Civil Legal Assistance for Low-Income Persons: Looking
Back and Looking Forward, 29 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 1213, 1236–38 (2002).
97
The State Basic Access Act, supra note 27.
98
Id. at § 205.
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Id. at § 300–04.
100
AMERICAN BAR ASS’N, ABA MODEL ACCESS ACT & ABA BASIC PRINCIPLES OF A
RIGHT TO COUNSEL IN CIVIL LEGAL PROCEEDINGS (2010), available at
http://www.abanet.org/legalservices/sclaid/ (visited Oct. 8, 2010). As John Pollack
explains, the draft Act is intended as a companion piece to the ABA’s Standing
Committee on Legal Aid and Indigent Defense (SCLAID)’s document entitled, “Basic
Principles of a Right to Counsel in Civil Legal Matters.” The Basic Principles document
follows up on the “ABA Principles of a State System for the Delivery of Civil Legal Aid”
document that was adopted by the ABA House of Delegates in 2006. See Pollack, supra
note 35.
101
Id. The exclusions include situations such as those where parties are not allowed to be
represented by licensed professionals, if legal representation is already provided, and if,
under standards established by the State Access Board, limited legal assistance is
sufficient to preserve the basic human needs at stake. See ABA MODEL ACCESS ACT,
supra note 100, at §3.B.iii.
102
See American Bar Association adopts Criminal Justice, Preemption and Civil Gideon
Policies (Aug. 9, 2010), available at http://www.abanow.org/2010/08/american-barassociation-adopts-criminal-justice-preemption-and-civil-gideon-policies/ (“Revisions to
the recommendation centered on child custody cases, and the needs of such cases from
jurisdiction to jurisdiction.”). The revisions are available online at
http://www.abanow.org/2010/07/am-2010-104/ (last visited Aug. 11, 2010).
While opposition emerged during the drafting process of the Model Act, the primary
opposition was framed primarily in terms of opposition to the Model Act approach itself,
rather than to particular lines being drawn. See, e.g. Letter of Jo Ann Wallace and Don
Saunders, NLADA (June 30, 2010) (“. . . we continue to maintain one overriding concern
with the current approach to the resolutions . . . [w]e strongly support the basic concept
underscoring the entire movement toward a civil right to counsel—that each state and
jurisdiction needs to decide on its own regarding the particular strategies . . . this critical
principle is substantially undercut by the current characterization of the draft legislation
as a ‘Model Act.’”). See also Powers et al., supra note 36, at 16.
103
See Memorandum in Support of Petition Requesting that the Supreme Court Take
Jurisdiction of an Original Class Action for Declaratory Judgment, Kelly, supra note 6, at
23. A summary of the case is reported at 39 CLEARINGHOUSE REV. 769 (2005).
104
Frase v. Barnhart 840 A.3d 114 (2003).
105
Brief of Appellant, Frase, supra note 6, at 54, available at
http://www.povertylaw.org/poverty-law-library/case/55300/55347.
106
This is the context of litigation in Washington State seeking to establish such a right.
See Machado v. Ashcroft, No. CS-02-0066-FVS (E.D. Wash. Mar. 14, 2002). According
to counsel involved in the efforts to obtain class-wide relief, the Machado Court granted
the temporary restraining order, ordering that counsel be assigned, before the plaintiff
elected to return voluntarily; the court subsequently granted the government’s motion to
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dismiss. E-mail from Matt Adams, Legal Director, Northwest Immigrant Rights Project,
to author (June 18, 2007, 14:07:07 EST) (on file with author). See also Finkel, supra note
83;
Even immigration judges recognize the need for appointment of counsel for
unaccompanied minors: “What is necessary, then, to insure fairness for the
unaccompanied juvenile who appears in Immigration Court charged with being
removable from the United States? . . . Because Immigration Court proceedings are
essentially legal in nature, the first and most obvious answer to that question seems
to be that legal representation be made available for the juvenile alien.”
Machado, No. CS-02-0066-FVS, at 11 (quoting Michael F. Rahill, OFFICE OF THE CHIEF
IMMIGRATION JUDGE, WHAT CHILD IS THIS? HOW IMMIGRATION COURTS RESPOND TO
UNACCOMPANIED MINORS 11 (2000)).
107
Id.
108
Brief of Amici Curiae, Frase v. Barnhart, supra note 6, at 29, available at
http://www.povertylaw.org/poverty-law-library/case/55300/55347.
109
King, supra note 6.
110
Id. at 672–76.
111
Id. at 673.
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Id.
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Id. at 674.
114
Id. at 661.
115
Id.; Brief of Appellant, King v. King, supra note 6, at 17–50, available at
http://www.povertylaw.org/poverty-law-library/case/56000/56032.
116
Motion for Leave to File Amicus Curiae Brief on Behalf of National Coalition for a
Civil Right to Counsel, King v. King, supra note 6, at 13, available at
http://www.povertylaw.org/poverty-law-library/case/56000/56032.
117
Brief of Appellant, King v. King, supra note 6, at 25, available at
http://www.povertylaw.org/poverty-law-library/case/56000/56032. The brief added that
where the opposing party is represented by counsel, that is a “factor to consider under the
fourth prong of the test.” Id. at 25, n.8.
118
Id. at 50.
119
The Indigent’s Right to Counsel in Civil Cases, supra note 53, at 552.
120
See generally RICHARD KLUGER, SIMPLE JUSTICE: THE HISTORY OF BROWN V.
BOARD OF EDUCATION AND BLACK AMERICA'S STRUGGLE FOR EQUALITY (Alfred A.
Knopf 1976).
121
See e.g., Russell Engler, Towards a Context-Based Civil Gideon Through “Access to
Justice” Initiatives, 40 CLEARINGHOUSE REV. 196, 198 (July-Aug. 2006) [hereinafter
Towards a Context]; Houseman, supra note 11, at 62–67; see generally Momentum
Grows, supra note 3.
122
Towards a Context, supra note 121, at 198–202. For a discussion of the importance of
understanding the civil Gideon initiative as an exercise in effectuating social change
rather than framing legal claims, see generally Civil Gideon, supra note 3.
123
See generally Justice for All, supra note 12.
124
See generally Ethics in Transition, supra note 19.
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Id. at 367–68, nn. 1 & 5. For a compilation of recent data across the country, see THE
JUSTICE GAP, UPDATED REPORT, supra note 37, at 23–26.
126
See, e.g., MEETING THE CHALLENGE, supra note 14, at 28–29.
127
Justice for All, supra note 12, at 1992–98, 2007–40.
128
See RES. 23, supra note 21.
129
See RES. 31, supra note 21. The joint resolution also endorsed COSCA’s Position
Paper on Self-Represented Litigation. Id.
130
See Justice for All, supra note 12, at 1998–2007.
131
For a discussion and analysis of the studies, see Connecting Self-Representation, supra
note 13, at 66–73.
132
Id.
133
Rebecca Sandefur, Elements of Expertise: Lawyers’ Impact on Civil Trial and Hearing
Outcomes 24 (Mar. 26, 2008) (unpublished manuscript, under review) (on file with
author).
134
See generally Connecting Self-Representation, supra note 13.
135
I discuss these factors in my article, Pursuing Access to Justice and Civil Right to
Counsel in a Time of Economic Crisis, 15 ROGER WILLIAMS U. L. REV. 472 (2010)
[hereinafter Pursuing Access]. This approach is similar to the one I suggested at the Joint
MBA/BBA Civil Gideon Symposium, held in October 2007. For a description of the
Symposium, see Civil Gideon Symposium mobilizes legal community behind equal justice
L.
J.
available
at
http://www.massbar.org/forin
law,
MASS.
attorneys/publications/lawyers-journal/2007/november/civil-gideon-symposiummobilizes-legal-community-behind-equal-justice-in-law.
136
Gideon’s New Trumpet, supra note 26. The Task Force’s Report describes the Justice
Gap in Massachusetts, the Task Force’s process, work of the Committees, Committee
reports and recommendations, and an explanation of the background and creation of the
Task Force. Id. at 3–7.
137
For a more detailed description of the process undertaken by the Housing Committee,
see Id. at 9–10.
138
News Release, Boston Bar Ass’n, Boston Bar Proposal to Prevent Homelessness Gets
Grant from Boston Foundation (Jan. 7, 2009), available at
http://www.bostonbar.org/prs/nr_0809/BostonFoundationGrant010709.htm.
The precise wording of the proposed pilot projects is as follows:
“Pilot Project for A Right to Counsel in Certain Eviction Cases”
I. Representation Proposal
A. Legal counsel shall be provided for indigent tenants in the following eviction
cases:
1. Cases involving household members with mental disabilities where
the disability is directly related to the reason for eviction; or
2. Cases involving criminal conduct (including cases brought pursuant
to M.G.L. c. 139, sec. 19 and those brought as summary process
cases); or
3. Cases in which, in the discretion of the judge, the absence of
representation for the tenant will lead to a substantial denial of
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justice. In the exercise of judicial discretion, judges shall consider
the following factors:
i. Factors relating to a tenant’s vulnerability, such as
disability, domestic violence, education, language, culture
or age;
ii. Factors relating to the landlord, such as whether the
landlord controls a large or small number of units,
whether the landlord is legally sophisticated, whether the
landlord is represented by counsel, and whether the
landlord lives in the building;
iii. The affordability of the unit for the tenant, including
whether the unit is in public or subsidized housing;
iv. Whether there appear to be cognizable defenses or
counterclaims in the proceeding;
v. Whether the loss of shelter might jeopardize other basic
needs of the tenant, such as safety, sustenance, health or
child custody;
vi. Other indicia of power imbalances between the parties.
B. Legal counsel shall be provided for indigent landlords where:
1. The landlord resides in the building that is the subject of the eviction
proceeding;
2. The landlord owns no other interest in real property;
3. The tenant is represented by counsel; and
4. The landlord’s shelter is at stake in the proceeding.
II. Proposals complementing the Representation Proposal
A. We will further recommend that the proposal above be supplemented with the
expansion of assistance programs, such as lawyer of the day programs for both
tenants and landlords in all Housing and District Courts, to reach all eligible
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